or i'resra e nt Kennedy was a great shock to the whole world.
To the American people it was more than a shock: it was a humilia-. tion. The shooting of the President, followed only two days later by the shooting of the pBEflagg assassin, Lee Oswald, seemed to show that the leading power of the West, the guardian of its security and culture, rested precariously on a basis of insecurity and violence, in order to reassure the world. President Johnson set up a commission of inquiry charged to discover the true facts. In order H , re l
SSUre the American People, he must have hoped that the true facts would revealespecially in an election yearno 'basic strain 3 i n American society. This is, in fact, what the commission has done.' n Its report, the Warren Keport has answered the factual question. The assassination is explained.
The report has also resolved the emotional problem: the assassination is explained away.
Oswald, we are assured, shot the President for • Purely^ personal motives, explicable by his psychological • case history. Jack Ruby shot Oswald on a purely personal impulse, similarly explicable Wo one else is involved. The police, which Watches over the city of Dallas, may have made errors; so may the secret service, which watches over the security of the President. These errors must be regretted and corrected in future: but Ainerican society is unaffected; ;vthe episode can. be forgotten; or at least, '.if/it is remembered, it leaves no taint in the American reputation, no-trauma in the American soul.
• committee. I did this because I was convinced that the composition of the Warren ornmission and the procedure which it announced were illcalculated to produce the truth, they did not guarantee a full examination of the evidence, and there was some reason to tear the relevant evidence might never come before the Commissmn.
The purpose of The committee was to guard against the danger that dissenting evidence might be silenced RE-ENACTMENT: through the telescopic sight of the rifle placed in the sixth-floor window between political authority and emotional expediency, but at the same time there was no need to prejudge the issue. Truth, can emerge even from an official body, and the political composition of the Commission and its defective methods need not necessarily prevent it from reaching valid conclusions, provided that it showed .itself capable of independent judgment. I was therefore perfectly willing to examine the report, when it should appear, on its merits, to let it stand or fall, in my judgment, on its handling of the evidence. It is by that standard that I now consider it an inadmissible report.
In order to demonstrate this, I shall concentrate on a few central facts which, to me, render the whole report suspect.
First of all there is the ttempted arrest of Oswald by atrolman Tippett. Any reader f the report must be struck by this episode. According to the report, the Dallas police issued the order which led to | this attempted arrest before any ^evidence had been found which ^pointed personally to Oswald. ;We immediately ask, on what evidence did they issue these orders? To fill the gap, the report mentions one witness, Howard Brennan, who-, we are told, saw the shots fired from the sixth-floor window and made a statement to the police " with-| in minutes " of the assassination. |This statement, says the report, Iwas " most probably " the basis |of the police description radioed \( among others) to Tippett. I Now this chain of events is Jobviously of the greatest im|portance.
It also contains i|obvious difficulties. Not only Jdoes the alleged statement of Brennan seem far too precise i to correspond with anything he j can really have seen, and the I alleged police description far ■ I too vague to be the basis of a | particular arrest, but the words I "most probably," which slide •jover these difficulties, are un^pardonably vague. Any police ^description leading to an Attempted arrest must have \peen based on some definite Evidence-the police must know n what evidence it was based i -and it was the inescapable uty of the Commission, which laims to have " critically ressessed " all the evidence, to Require the police to reveal the •Evidence.
Either the police /{description was based on Bren|nan's statement, or it was not. {Certainty, in such a matter, is The record was | destroyed by the F.B.I. or the 1 police, and the Commission, with Iculpable indifference, has not ^troubled to ask why. In the ^introduction to its report the /Commission expresses special |gratitude to the Dallas police, (Tor its readiness to answer all/ | questions. The reader can only] (/marvel at the Commission's) ^readiness to accept every answer* -provided that it came fromf Vi-that source. | V If the police withheld or sup-1 fpressed its evidence, at least | weapon into the building. Since | there was one other source on j this conclusion is in fact con* ■ which the Commission might (itrarv to the only evidence |7Jiave drawn: the. medical evi-^ Vdence of the President's wounds. ^Unfortunately, here too we | quickly discover the same patprinted by the Commission; it seems strange that the police Should have to admit that the ;|pag, too, has since been 1 de* I tern of suppression. On medical |stroyed. It was, we are told, S evidence alone, the doctor who discoloured during various j examined the President con-| laboratory examinations " and l £l u ded that he had been shot g so " a replica bag " was manu-| ifr°m the front, and all police ffactured under police orders ^investigations were at first based v " f or valid identification by hu ass i im P Ruby's close association with the Dallas police is admitted in the Warren Report, and it is undeniable that he entered the basement, where he murdered Oswald, by either the ngigUgence^a^-the But how'did he enter? Once again, the details are of the greatest importance-but the police are unable or unwilling to say, and the Commission is unwilling to press them.
All that we are lold is that, after his arrest $tuby refused to discuss his leans of entry: he was inter-| Only the official autopsy, com-irogated in vain.
But then, #iled (as is clearly stated) with I suddenly, three policemen came |the aid of police evidence, sur-f forward and said that, within fvives-and the Commission, 1 half an hour of his arrest, Ruby |once again, has accepted this fbad admitted to them that he ^evidence without asking why, or ! bad entered by the main street
• on whose authority, the original y ram P J ust before shooting | notes were destroyed. Police evi-I Oswald-after which Ruby himj, dence withheld, police evidence f self adopted this explanation of y destroyed, medical evidence v his entry. These three police-| destroyed, and no questions : »= men » we are told * did not report f asked. This is an odd record in : i this important piece of evidence to their superiors, who had been vainly interrogating Ruby on precisely this point, " until some | According to the report, a ? specially constructed paper bag | was afterwards found in-the | * room from which Oswald is l alleged to have fired the shots, \ acid the Commission concludes days later." Why, or in what circumstances, Ruby made this interesting admission, and why the three policemen did not pass it on for several days, are I that it was in this bag that f clearly important questions. But
Oswald introduced the fatal I the Commission evidently did ?not ask them. It was content
• to repeat what it was told by j the police, with the saving j adverb " probably." Much more could be said about the Warren Report: about its selective standards of confidence, its uncritical acceptance (or rejection) of evidence, its reluctance to ask essential questions. It would be easy to lose one's way in the mass of detail. I have concentrated on one question. I have stated that, althougn the composition and procedure of the Commission are highly unsatisfactory, its report could still be credible provided that the Commission showed itself capable of independent judgment. All the instances I have given show clearly that it had no such independent judgment. Committed by its own choice to receive most of its evidence from police or F.B.I. sources, it never subjected this evidence to proper legal or intellectual tests. Never looked beyond that evidence, never pressed for clear meaning or clear answers. The claim of the ■ Commissioners that they " critically reassessed " the police evidence is mere rhetoric. Their vast and slovenly report has no more authority than the tendentious and defective police reports out of which it is compiled.
And of the value of j those reports no more need be said than that even the Warren Report can only acquit the Dallas police of worse charges by admitting its culpable inefficiency.
j Where then does the Warren Report leave the problem of President Kennedy's assassination? My own belief is that the -problem remains a mystery.
Nothing in the Warren Report can be taken on 'trust. There is no evidence that Oswald took the gun into the book deposi-; tory, nor that he fired it. He may have done so, but it is still ■ to be proved. The evidence ^laboriously presented by the F.B.I. and the Dallas police ; against Oswald is no stronger {than the evidence incidentally j, admitted against themselves by 'l their suppression and destruc-' tion of vital testimony. The best that can be said of the Warren Commission is that it has given publicity to the prosecutor's case. The case for the defence has not been heardand until it is heard, no valid judgment can be given. More significant is the ' question, why has the report been so uncritically hailed by /the Press of America and even of / /Britain? I find this a disturbing /fact: it suggests a failure of the j critical spirit in journalism. In :'part this is explicable by mere j ; technical necessity. A work like the Warren Report (or the Robbins Report) appears to be j well documented, It is issued under respectable public names. \ It is too long to read-and its authors, recognising this fact,
• obligingly serve up to busy journalists a " summary and conclusions " in which the chain of_ Reasoning is concealed. The journalist who has to express a hasty but emphatic judgment glances at the document, weighs it, reads the summary, and then plumps for a safe opinion. That may not necessarily be an ^endorsement of the document-• .but it will be a safe orthodoxy.
There is an orthodoxy of opposition, even of " liberalism," which is no less smug and unthinking than the orthodoxy of assent. Sometimes the two orthodoxies coincide. observer " who was content merely to observe, has made a series of formidable criticisms of the report.
They are documented, reasoned and, in my opinion, generally conclusive. For his pains, he has been subjected to an incredible campaign of vituperation in the American and even the British Press. To the Press, it seems, the report is a sacred text, not to be questioned by the profane. And yet, behind the Press, there still stands the public: a public which, I believe, is becoming increasingly sceptical both of the Press and of the report.
The American public does not much discuss the report. The same psychological causes which excite the Press to shrillness drive the public into silence: for both shrillness and silence are protections for uncertainty. When I offer to discuss the report with Americans, many of them evade the offer. Some say frankly that they have not read the report but are determined to believe its conclusions: they are so reassuring. But many are sceptical. In fact, a recent poll showed that a majority of Americans were sceptical. No doubt the majority had not read the report either-but in such an atmosphere there is hope that the matter is not yet closed. Orthodoxy is not yet finalheresy may still be heard.
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